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Despite its short historical moment in the sun, behaviorism has become something 
akin to a theoria non grata, a position that dare not be explicitly endorsed1. The 
reasons for this are complex, of course, and they include sociological factors which 
we cannot consider here, but to put it briefly: many have doubted the ambition to 
establish law-like relationships between mental states and behavior that dispense with 
any sort of mentalistic or intentional idiom, judging that explanations of intelligent 
behavior require reference to qualia and/or mental events2. Today, when behaviorism 
is discussed at all, it is usually in a negative manner, either as an attempt to discredit 
an opponent’s view via a reductio, or by enabling a position to distinguish its identity 
and positive claims by reference to what it is (allegedly) not.  
 
In this paper, however, we argue that the ghost of behaviorism is present in 
influential, contemporary work in the field of embodied and enactive cognition, and 
even in aspects of the phenomenological tradition that these theorists draw on. Rather 
than take this to be a problem for these views as some have (e.g. Block 2005; Jacob 
2011; O’Brien and Opie 2015), we argue that once the behaviorist dimensions are 
clarified and distinguished from the straw-man version of the view, it is in fact an 
                                                 
1 That said, Quine and Dennett are two very influential philosophers who acknowledge that their work 
has neo-behaviorist dimensions, as does Sellars via Edward Tolman (see Olen 2018). 
2 In philosophy, concerns related to the multiple realizability of mental events (i.e. pain) across 
different species, and perhaps computationally, have also been influential. We discuss pain below, but 
for a good response to this concern see Myin and Zahnoun 2018. 
 2
asset, one which will help with task of setting forth a scientifically reputable version 
of enactivism and/or philosophical behaviorism that is nonetheless not brain-centric 
but behavior-centric. While this is a bit like “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” 
strategy, as Shaun Gallagher notes (2019), with the shared enemy of behaviorism and 
enactivism being classical Cartesian views and/or orthodox cognitivism in its various 
guises, the task of this paper is to render this alliance philosophically plausible.  
 
To do so, we begin by drawing on Gilbert Ryle and John Haugeland to set out a 
holistic version of behaviorism that is not obviously vulnerable to some of the 
received criticisms of the view, but which also has enough specificity to be 
distinguished from neo-pragmatism and other allied positions. In the second section 
of the paper, we deploy these insights to re-read B. F. Skinner’s work and look at the 
initial literature on the question of the relationship between his radical behaviorism 
and phenomenology, showing how this approach is favorable compared to other 
readings (e.g. Stout 2006; Tanney 2005) and also complements some other recent 
revisionist work on this question (e.g. Barrett 2019). In the third section, we arrive at 
perhaps the central claim of the paper: showing that various key behaviorist moves 
and insights are also apparent in contemporary enactivist work, focusing on a recent 
paper of Gallagher’s (with Somogy Varga) on direct social perception, which is 
charged with behaviorism by Pierre Jacob (2011). Although an obvious rejoinder is 
that Gallagher and many of the other key theorists of embodied cognition and 
enactivism are significantly indebted to phenomenology, and therefore are not 
behaviorists, in the fourth section of the paper we show that a significant behaviorist 
element is also present in the work of some classically recognized phenomenological 
figures (e.g. Merleau-Ponty), as counter-intuitive as this may seem.3 
 
1. Behaviorism revisited: A Rylean take 
 
At its heart, behaviorism is the theory that mental or intentional states can be 
explained in terms of behavior. Weaker versions of the view hold that mental or 
                                                 
3 Acknowledgements: We would like to acknowledge the seminar audiences at Deakin, Melbourne, 
and Monash universities, for their helpful feedback on this paper. In addition, we are appreciative of 
some insightful suggestions for improvement from the reviewers. 
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intentional states are best thus explained, stronger versions contend that they can only 
be explained in this way, or that they are thereby exhaustively explained, which 
could mean we dispense with such notions (Feyerabend 1963, 1965), or that we 
reduce mental or intentional idioms to the physical (Churchland 1986). However, the 
motivation behind the theory is less specific than this, particularly if we start from the 
roots of J.B. Watson’s early conception: we can learn all there is to know about 
Homo sapiens just as we would with any species of animal; we monitor their 
behavior and piece together what we can from observations of the interaction 
between the organism and its milieu. 
 
For many, this leaves out some of the most important aspects of human intelligence, 
including our inner lives, without which we are reduced to mere animals and left with 
no way to explain what makes us unique (language, love, flexible problem-solving, 
etc.). But the continuity thesis with respect to animality and basic cognition that 
behaviorism endorses is less counter-intuitive if we do not conceive of the animal 
mechanistically, that is, in terms of any rote stimulus and response, but rather also in 
terms of habits, skills, and learning4. This is all part of a strong behaviorist tradition, 
which includes all of the key figures and, at least in the work of George Herbert 
Mead (1934, 38), Edward Tolman (1932, 1951), and Gilbert Ryle, this is not given a 
mechanistic or reductive inflexion. Indeed, Peter Olen summarizes this well, noting 
that: 
What matters is that the initial approach to studying language and inner 
episodes is either to see them as ‘habit’ or ‘a form of behavior’, or as simply 
reducible to physiological characterization (Olen 2018) 
In short, the behaviorist wants to explain the nature of inner episodes and language 
through habit formation (including culture and history) and other physical factors that 
shape the body and brain. This is a very broad notion that can be explored in many 
different ways. This broad conception has traditionally been parceled into three 
categories: methodological behaviorism (psychology should be approached from a 
                                                 
4 We are not arguing that early behaviorism wholly succeeded in understanding animals and that the 
only problem left for it was explaining distinctively human skills and abilities. On the contrary, it is 
arguable that contemporary enactivist work delivers better on the behaviorist promise regarding 
understanding the continuity between human and animal behavior, showing that both cases require a 
major role being given to perspectival indexicality. In addition, enactivism can enrich behaviorism’s 
understanding of the reciprocal causal relations between an organism and its milieu, but making that 
case is another paper. 
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behaviorist perspective), psychological behaviorism (the research project of 
behaviorism in psychology), and analytical or logical behaviorism (a behaviorist 
theory of semantics within philosophy) (Tanney 2009b). However, we believe this is 
exclusionary of an under-examined holistic and non-reductive approach to 
behaviorism, which has made (and continues to make) significant contributions to the 
overall goal of explaining human intelligence while avoiding the traditional 
problems. In short, we want to retain some of the core values of behaviorism but also 
cast aside some of the baggage that has wrongly been portrayed as a necessary 
component of it. 
 
The work of Gilbert Ryle best exemplifies this variant, while other holistic versions 
of behaviorism can also be gleaned in psychology, for example in Mead’s social 
behaviorism, in Tolman’s “molar” behaviorism where there is an orientation to a 
given object as “goal” and not just a proximate stimulus that alone mechanistically 
causes behavior (Tolman 1932, cf. also Baum 2005), and even in some aspects of 
Skinner’s radical behaviorism as we see in Section 2. But to commence with Ryle, 
his work aims to exorcise the ghost in the machine, which can be understood in two 
ways. Firstly, the refutation of Cartesian substance dualism (Ryle 2009, 21), and 
secondly to reveal the “category mistake” that mental processes are distinct from the 
actions they enable. Ryle writes that: “To talk of a person’s mind [...] is to talk of the 
person’s abilities, liabilities and inclinations to do and undergo certain sorts of things, 
and of the doing and undergoing of these things in the ordinary world” (ibid., 22). In 
other words, to understand a person’s beliefs, thoughts, etc., we need to understand 
their behavioral dispositions, but dispositions are not the sort of thing that can be 
articulated as a mental state or property that obtains inside an agent, or even that 
should be strictly identified with its neurological conditions in that instant (and hence 
the issues that crop up for the identity theory of the mind and physicalism more 
generally). If behavioral kinds define mental kinds, and behavioral kinds can be 
explained by physical states, then by law of transitivity we seem able to conclude that 
mental kinds are defined by physical states. However, if a larger scale approach is 
taken with Ryle, including his reference to action in the ordinary world, then this 
collapse into the physical does not necessarily happen, and he can avoid any idea of 
nomological reduction and one-to-one correspondences between mental 
state/property and a particular behavior. 
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Consider one of Ryle’s examples, that of a habitual smoker: 
My being an habitual smoker does not entail that I am at this or that moment 
smoking; it is my permanent proneness to smoke when I am not eating, 
sleeping, lecturing or attending funerals, and have not quite recently been 
smoking (Ryle 2009, 31). 
Here we see the dependence of habits and dispositions on a social context. The mere 
behavior of being a smoker already has context, one does not smoke when lecturing 
or attending funerals or hospitals, or any other situations that the agent learns it is 
inappropriate to smoke at. On such an account, an agent should never be understood 
as being stagnant, trotting out a handful of behaviors on command. Instead, an agent 
develops, adapts, and expresses new behavior over time. The defining claim for 
behaviorists is that previous interactions will be indispensable (if not exhaustive) to 
explaining future ones, albeit in often dynamic and therefore unique ways. To 
understand the smoker we must include such things as the physical effects of nicotine 
and the consequences of withdrawal, but we should also know whether that person is 
in a movie theatre or a hospital. This non-reductionist approach puts aside physical 
particulars, focusing instead on behavior in an overall larger context. It attempts to 
give legitimacy to the idea that the object of study is patterns of behavior over time in 
relation to an environment, which is always socio-historical but in a way that is also 
continuous with the behavior of animals, in particular those species that are also 
social. This can be read as something like the “goal objects,” which help describe a 
complex set of behaviors, following Tolman’s analysis of the rat in the maze, rather 
than simply passively responding to a direct external stimuli in mechanistic and 
passive fashion (Tolman 1932; cf. Merleau-Ponty 2010). While there are objections 
that Tolman’s view assumes or smuggles in an intentional vocabulary (goals, 
purposes, etc.), his basic point resonates with Ryle’s: behavior cannot be understood 
without the socio-historical context, wherein there is a complex intertwining of direct 
and indirect (proximal and distal) stimuli. Holistic behaviorism hence contends that 
talk of mental states and events are best understood as behavioral habits, actions, and 
tendencies. Such a theory aims to understand intentionality in a holistic, socio-
environmental way that is compatible with scientific investigation, but it need not 
involve any commitment to reducibility.  
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As we will argue in more detail in Section 3, this account of intentionality resembles 
many enactivist theories. To anticipate, they share a commitment to explanatory 
holism, and in some cases also explicitly via understanding belief as a disposition 
(e.g. Gallagher 2005, 214), with the role of embodied habits being pivotal. Both are 
committed to some form of externalism in which the ego is in the world and 
consciousness is adverbial, fundamentally a doing (cf. Rowlands 2010), about being 
engaged in the world and projects: even, we might say, to an enaction. Ryle also has 
an adverbial take on cognition, in which behavior is intelligent, or not, based on the 
character of the action (so a clown is characterized as falling over cleverly as part of 
their skit, while an author of this paper falls over clumsily when walking their dog). 
This adverbial approach is meant to offer a middle way between the merely mental 
and the reductively physical (see Jackson 2011, 68-70). Because of such views, there 
is a shared deflationary response to the traditional conceptual and epistemological 
problem(s) concerning the existence of other minds (or particular attitudes or mental 
states of other people), since there is a loose allegiance to the idea that mental and 
intentional matters are best understood through behavior patterns. Like Watson, Ryle 
also emphasizes what is observable, but he has a more nuanced and sophisticated 
sense of this. The observable is not just muscular movement without context, but we 
see patterns of behavior that reveal more than meets the eye (construed in terms of 
retinal stimulation at a particular instant), and often more than any given agent might 
be consciously aware of (e.g. gestures, ways of inhabiting space, etc.), anticipating 
aspects of contemporary enactivist theses concerning direct (social) perception.  
 
Nonetheless, a lingering question might be why these views are behaviorist in nature, 
rather than, say, a version of pragmatism where social context is also emphasized. 
This is a difficult question to parse, once we have given up an understanding of 
behavior as mere behavior with behaviorist philosophers like Mead, Tolman and 
Ryle, but it is useful to consider John Haugeland’s (1990) influential division between 
neo-Cartesians, neo-Behaviorism and neo-Pragmatists (see also Hutto and Satne 
2015). The neo-Cartesians are best characterized by Jerry Fodor and his 
computational theory of mind (Fodor 1975, 1994); intentionality is defined by 
computation, or representational mental states. However, this traditional theory of 
mind is precisely what enactivist and other 4e accounts of cognition are trying to 
move away from, mostly fueled by anti-internalist arguments. This opens the door to 
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neo-Behaviorism, which explains intentionality via ascription, with the main 
representative being Daniel Dennett (1978, 1987). However, that we define what is 
and isn’t intentional by ascribing that trait to certain acts/individuals is generally seen 
as problematic. For example, we can state that the vending machine didn’t want to 
give me to the bottle of soft drink I paid for, and that it is plotting against me, as it 
always gives my friend his drink but often fails to give me mine. It seems important to 
be able to state independently of choice or non-scientific observation when 
intentionality is being correctly ascribed (see Alksnis 2015). 
 
For many enactivists and other 4e supporters, this leaves neo-pragmatism as the 
preferred option (Hutto and Myin 2013; Gallagher 2017; Rosenthal and Bourgeois 
1991; Jackson 2014), and they therefore draw on philosophers like Robert Brandom 
(1994), who claims that intentionality emerges from cultural practice. The goal of 
many of these thinkers is to show how a holistic, cultural understanding of 
intentionality is possible, and enactivists often appear to endorse Haugeland’s idea 
that the socio-cultural context is what differentiates the neo-pragmatist position from 
the neo-behaviorist. But the socio-cultural context is available to the behaviorist. As 
Ryle has well indicated, gestures and the like have a social meaning and significance 
(as they do with various species of animal too, whose behavior is also more complex 
than mere mechanistic responses), but the question is how are we best to understand 
how they work and from where they derive their power. Do they primarily derive 
from language and discursive intentionality? Or are habits and social norms on a 
continuum, some of which obtains with animals too? The latter would be the 
beginnings of a more behaviorist position.  
 
Nonetheless, the separation between the two is not as clear as is sometimes thought. 
In psychology, radical behaviorism is often seen as closely related to pragmatism (see 
Baum 2005, 30-4; c.f. also Rachlin and Frankel 2009). In philosophy, as Haugeland 
himself notes: 
we might imagine a neo-behaviorist and a neo-pragmatist agreeing that 
animals and people share a certain primitive sort of intentionality […] and yet 
also that a qualitatively ‘higher’ intentionality is possible only for conformists 
with a culture and language […] Questions could be raised, of course, about 
what the two sorts of intentionality have to do with one another – why, in 
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particular, both are sorts of intentionality – but perhaps there would be enough 
similarities to justify the common term. (Haugeland 1998, 160-1) 
A primitive account of intentionality could be a general directedness towards, 
without an understanding about something. For example, an animal can be directed 
towards food, without a concept of a meal, or that the food keeps the animal alive. 
The behaviorist and enactivist claim that we endorse is, with Carl Sachs, that 
“somatic intentionality precedes discursive intentionality both phylogenetically (in 
evolutionary history) and ontogenetically (in psychological development), and a 
complete account of both kinds of intentionality would have to not only acknowledge 
this fact but explain the causal relation between the two” (Sachs 2014, 152). Our 
view is that behaviorism is more helpful in this latter regard, and that neo-
pragmatism by contrast confronts difficulties regarding animals, and indeed human 
animality, that behaviorism does not. Briefly put, neo-pragmatism often looks less 
naturalist, since humans alone are part of the game of giving and asking for reasons a 
la Brandom. It appears that those outside of the human linguistic practices are 
defined as being “poor-in-world”, to invoke some famous remarks from Heidegger in 
his Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. From this perspective, explaining how an 
individual, or humans as a species, ascend to be rich-in-world is unclear, at best (cf. 
Carman 2003; Danón 2018). By contrast, however, behaviorism is better placed to 
offer an adequate understanding of intelligent action that accommodates gradualist 
theses in philosophy of biology, as Watson, Tolman, and others, have emphasized5.  
 
2. Holistic behaviorism: Skinner and beyond 
 
To align the work of enactivism with behaviorism we will first examine some notable, 
but perhaps forgotten, responses to Skinner’s work. Our goal here is to reveal the 
depth of one of behaviorism’s more maligned theories, while also showing just how 
compatible such approaches are with enactivism and some aspects of contemporary 
naturalized phenomenology. Through this investigation we also hope to dispel the 
idea that holism should be taken as a cure for, or a proof against, behaviorism. 
 
                                                 
5 Fully explicating this is beyond us here, but see Reynolds 2019 for an account of how phenomena 
like mind, mentality, and morality might be understood in relation to animal behavior. 
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While not a common approach, there have been a handful of attempts to link 
behaviorism and phenomenology since both theories came into prominence, 
particularly as translations of French and German texts become readily available in 
English in the middle of the 20th Century. The most common approach to bring these 
two differing theories together is to select a leading phenomenologist and contrast it 
with the radical ideas of Skinner (Corriveau 1972; Faulconer and Williams 1985; 
Kvale and Grenness 1967; Packer 1985)6, or, less commonly, to pick a milder version 
of behaviorism like Mead and use that for the juxtaposition (Rosenthal and Bourgeois 
1991). Such an analysis is effective at bringing out what commonalities there are 
beyond the most obvious listed above, and so provides a resource for our own 
endeavors. 
 
While not especially well-versed in phenomenology, Willard F. Day is known for his 
advocacy of behaviorism, not least through his work in founding and running the 
journal Behaviorism (later entitled Behavior and Philosophy, see Knapp 1989). His 
work draws primarily on Wittgenstein, rather than a phenomenologist (Day 1969). 
Wittgenstein’s relationship to both phenomenology and behaviorism have been much 
debated and we cannot resolve some of the difficult interpretive issues here. It is 
useful, however, to consider Day’s discussion of anti-reductionism, an idea that is 
generally not attributed to Skinner (Day 1969, 492). In philosophy of mind Skinner’s 
radical ideas are normally associated with a severe empiricism (Kim 2006; Dennett 
1978), perhaps even the ontological poverty of Quine (1969) rather than anti-
reductionism. Yet, as Day brings to our attention, Skinner must operate on the level of 
behaviors, which are invariably complex and multifaceted interactions. Furthermore, 
Skinner is anti-abstraction, for he wants all human events to be observable. This 
means he cannot appeal to something like a functionalist explanation that is overlaid 
on a physical structure such as the brain. Operating on the level of a behavioral 
description, then, ensures that the theory is (or at least should be) anti-reductionist in 
nature. 
 
                                                 
6 A book seemingly dedicated to the topic, entitled Behaviorism and Phenomenology (ed. Wann, 1964), 
refers to phenomenology as being related to the psychological investigation of the phenomenal, rather 
than the more accepted interpretation of phenomenology we are using in this paper. 
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Day also brings to our attention other similarities between Wittgenstein and Skinner, 
notably their anti-dualism and anti-mentalism, where the latter is defined as being 
Cartesian style mental states, something Skinner vehemently rejects. Labeling these 
two thinkers as anti-Cartesian is hardly controversial, but for Judith Scharff (1999), 
Skinner was not enough of an anti-Cartesian. Scharff claims that it is Skinner’s 
commitment (or stance as one reviewer suggests) to determinism that leads him to this 
Cartesian theory of mind, as he wrestled with the difficulties in his own work. Such 
concerns around inconsistent, or non-lawlike behavior, was something that Skinner 
often struggled with. Consider a much discussed example from the philosophical 
literature, that of Putnam’s super-Spartans (1963). In the case of pain, we expect 
someone who is feeling pain, that is, having a pain stimulus, would naturally respond 
with a certain behavior, like wincing in pain. However, in the super-Spartan case, due 
to the society’s warrior attitude, all soldiers have been trained not to react to pain 
stimuli at all, breaking any claim that pain is defined by a certain physical response to 
the stimuli, as behaviorism seems to require. 
 
One behaviorist defense against this has been to distinguish between something like 
the connotation and denotation of behaviors (Hocutt 1985, 1986), or that “mental and 
behavioral terms express different concepts (have different meanings), they, 
nonetheless, refer to the same properties” (Rowlands 1991, 97). For our super-
Spartans, they may have different reactions to the stimulus, even though they share 
the painful properties with those of us that do wince. However, Putnam (1963) was 
aware of such a reply, coming up with super-super-Spartans, those that would even 
deny they experienced pain, or simply had no language to express it. If we extend this 
lack of similarities to everything but the experience of pain itself, this seems to 
remove any possibility that mental states are reducible to behavior. 
 
That behaviorism cannot account for such an example has been the dominant 
conclusion since Putnam put the critique forward, but if we follow on from Scharff 
and Day’s observations, we should reassess this critique. Rather than looking only to 
the experience of the agent, if we want to understand the behavior of the Spartan we 
also need to look at her enculturation. The reason we act differently compared to the 
Spartans is due to our different upbringing as individuals and the different ways our 
societies have developed. As Rowland Stout notes: 
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The point about the super-spartans is that they have a reason to repress their 
pain behavior. If that reason were reversed, then presumably they would express 
their feelings of pain. That is all that is required for the behaviorist. (Stout 2006, 
9) 
We will touch on what a “reason” is in a case like this below, but the basic point is 
that we can account for the super-Spartan’s pain response when we go beyond the 
scope of an individual, specifically, the response behavior the Spartan is taught, 
combined with the plasticity of the brain (Ward 2001). To know whether a Spartan is 
in pain is not just to look for a wince in her face when she is struck, it is instead to 
recognize that the behavior is part of (or differs from) a larger pattern, and perhaps 
notice the lack of full extension of her arm in her strikes or the comparative lack of 
vigor when running to meet the enemy. Consider a trainee solider not being able to 
control her reactions, even after years of operant conditioning (i.e. further pain 
inflicted if she winces in pain). Her subsequent expulsion from the ranks again helps 
us explain why the Spartans act as they do compared to those whose pain behaviors 
are more easily observable7. Furthermore, it may well be that the operant conditioning 
works in a way that pervades both mind and body, and hence that in a certain sense 
the Spartan does not experience pain (e.g. an identical mental state) in the same way 
as those of us not so enculturated might, if we were confronted with what may appear 
to be the same stimuli on a strictly nerve-muscular construal. 
 
Returning to the work of Scharff, she notes that Skinner found it hard to break out of 
an individualistic account of behavior. To support her claim Scharff points to 
Skinner’s difficulties with the nomological aspect of his theory (Scharff 1999, 4-6), 
and his attempts to modify his account of reflexes, something he struggled with and 
adapted throughout the length of his career (Skinner 1932, 1935, 1937, 1953, 1974). 
While Scharff singles out Skinner’s determinism as being the driving factor in these 
struggles, we question this and instead think it was his attempt to find regularity in 
                                                 
7 We acknowledge that this account lacks an explanation for the phenomenal character of pain, but this 
is not different from other naturalist accounts such as functionalist ones (see F. Jackson and Petit 1988, 
for a critique see Block 1978). Along similar lines it could be argued that the super-super-Spartans case 
once again dismisses the behaviorist moves we are making. However, this would lead to a genuine 
worry that the notion of pain has been bracketed away to the realm of the purely mental. If there is no 
trace of pain beyond the pure sensation, that is, no trace would be detectable in an agent’s physiology 
or within a larger historical context, the concept of pain seems to operate in a mind/body dichotomy in 
which the mind leaves no trace on the body. 
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what, from a more holistic perspective were often different situations (as in the case 
of the super-Spartans). Where we do align with Scharff is to endorse the claim that 
the work of Skinner can be expanded upon by adapting the notion of behavior to a 
non-reductive holistic one. Scharff attempted to combine Heidegger with Skinner (see 
Morf 1989 for a Sartrean version of this move), looking to ease Skinner’s extreme 
determinism with less rigid language (Scharff 1999, 8). 
 
For us, however, it is in Ryle’s work that we better see what Skinner’s is lacking. 
Ryle’s account of intelligence is inherently more holistic and actually takes some 
inspiration from the phenomenologists (especially Heidegger and Husserl, see 
Thomasson 2002; Chase and Reynolds 2017) while also working within a materialist, 
if not naturalist framework. However, not all see Ryle as an advocate for behaviorism. 
Julia Tanney (2005, 2009a) argues against the label of behaviorism being applied to 
Ryle, pointing out that his view does not align with philosophical behaviorism as 
associated with the logical positivists. In fact, Ryle can be said to argue against 
empiricism of this kind (Tanney 2009b). We would agree with this, but emphasize 
that our account distances Ryle from the caricature of behaviorism. What Tanney 
primarily sees as distinguishing Ryle from behaviorism is his anti-reductionism, a 
trait we have just argued fits well with a more holistic approach to behaviorism, rather 
than being a counter to it. 
 
Similarly, Gabrielle Jackson takes the proximity of Ryle to phenomenological figures 
such as Merleau-Ponty as a clear sign that he is not a behaviorist, yet we will soon see 
that being a phenomenologist does not exclude one from also having behaviorist 
commitments regarding perception, action, and cognition. Furthermore, the import 
placed on the body in her applications of Merleau-Ponty and Ryle to empirical work 
is in no way oppositional to the approach we suggest (Jackson 2014, 2018). Rather, it 
fits well with the idea that psychology plus historical context are both needed to 
explain human behavior. In the next section we will continue our argument for why 
what is often labeled an enactive approach is often very difficult to distinguish from a 
holistic behaviorism. 
 
Stout, however, agrees with our assessment of Ryle’s behaviorism, and uses it to 
further his own account (Stout 2006). Labeled non-reductive behaviorism, Stout 
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emphasizes what we have identified as an essential feature to advance behaviorism 
beyond its normal, over simplified characterization. His work introduces the idea of 
practical rationality to help define intelligent behavior from other kinds. He uses this 
notion to define mental states as those dispositions that compel an agent to act 
rationally (ibid., chapter 6). To return to Stout’s quote above, this would make the 
reason for the Spartan’s action tied to a notion of rationality, for example, to stay in 
their current job they need not flinch when in pain. 
 
This demand of rationality may be better taken up by Merleau-Ponty’s conception of 
the “intentional arc” (see section 4), or the idea of large projects as suggest by Ryle. 
This is in part due to Stout’s conception of practical rationality being grounded in 
something like projects, for as he acknowledges what is rational in one situation may 
not be in another (ibid., 100). Instead, it is the context of a given situation that helps 
illuminate what is, or isn’t, the more compelling action to take. There is also a worry 
that Stout justifies the actions of the Spartan by saying she wants to stay a Spartan and 
therefore does not flinch at pain. This would be bringing in mental language to 
describe behavior, something the classical behaviorist does not have the luxury to do 
(Hempel 1966). Counter to this, we prioritize the context around the agent as being 
key to understanding her intelligent behavior. We acknowledge that Stout’s work may 
in fact be compatible with our own, as it is simply not clear what are the bounds he 
places on the practical and this needs to be further clarified before the idea of 
“rationality” can be applied. 
 
3. Enactivist behaviorism: direct social perception 
 
To introduce some of the connections between behaviorism (holistic) and enactivism, 
it is helpful to offer a short historical reminder. Following the eclipse of behaviorism 
in both psychology and philosophy in the 1970s and 1980s, there was a turn towards 
functionalist-computationalist models of the mind and cognition. This was 
accompanied by a turn away from any holistic concern with bodies and any 
conception of intelligence as grounded in overt action and performance. This involved 
a rejection not just of positions that understood intelligence through embodied action, 
but also the theories that adopted and relied (to greater or lesser extents) on this kind 
of approach, which included behaviorism, pragmatism, and also, as we will see, 
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phenomenology. For these views the meaning of actions are not in the head of an 
agent, but rather in the world in which the agent moves through. The behaviorist 
version of this position is best captured by the Rylean dictum that “overt intelligent 
performances are not clues to the working of minds, that rather they are those 
workings” (Finn 1971, 432). Although this does not entail a commitment to the 
reducibility of mind to any narrow conception of the physical, there remains a strong 
claim of identity in Finn’s formulation that is important for our purposes here. 
Intelligent performances are the workings of the mind, and as such cognition and 
intelligence must be understood in the doing, in their embodied enaction.  
 
This is also the view propounded by Tolman’s “molar” behaviorism, wherein he is 
prepared to refer to the purposiveness of the rat in the maze, rather than eschew the 
idea all together as with the more reductive “molecular” version of behaviorism. 
Tolman contrasts his behaviorist approach with his ‘mentalist’ opponent in ways that 
resonate with Finn’s remark. He says that the mentalist “merely infers purpose from 
these aspects of behavior; whereas we, being behaviorists, identify purpose with such 
aspects” (Tolman 1951, 33, cf. also Rachlin and Frankel 2009 for a different version 
of the view). 
 
To make clearer what is at stake in these kinds of identification processes, consider 
what Ryle’s behaviorist position was replaced with in philosophy, following the work 
of Hilary Putnam and others. Jack Smart summarized the general consensus when he 
held that: “I would prefer to say, for example, that fear is the state of a person which 
is the causal condition of the characteristic behavior pattern, rather than as with Ryle 
that it is the behavior pattern” (Smart 1963, 89). Related transformations were also 
happening in psychology, where it is said that cognitive science killed behaviorism 
(Chase and Watson 2004). In short, a cognitivist turn took place in both philosophy 
and psychology, often accompanied by a form of belief-desire psychology in which 
mental states are envisaged to cause behavior, “top-down” accounts which bestow a 
central role to the computer/cognizing agent, with embodiment (and sometimes 
biology) rendered inessential (Wheeler 2005). Action and performance became a 
product of intelligence, whether in terms of mental states or causally/neurologically 
construed (representations, simulations, etc.).  
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Challenges to this orthodoxy come from a variety of areas, but perhaps most notably 
from 4e cognition. Many of these positions emphasize their return to philosophy of 
the body. As such, they tend to understand perception, action, and cognition in an 
embodied and enactive manner that is more bottom-up in orientation, explicating a 
basic operative intentionality that is the condition for more complex forms of 
intentionality and cognition. Like Ryle, they focus on behavior patterns in a holistic 
manner, rather than a mental representation as cause of the behavior pattern 
characteristic of fear, as in the cognitivist strategy found in Fodor and others. And the 
point is not to deny that there is something it feels like to be fearful, but to 
acknowledge that behavior is never simply “thrashing about” (including in animal 
ethology), and to explain it through contextual patterns, as we sought to do in our 
behaviorist response to Putnam’s super-Spartans scenario. As a reviewer has pointed 
out, there is agreement in the various versions of enactivism regarding a “mind-
behavior identity theory”, where behavior is understood as intelligent action in the 
world, which is a property of a whole organism-environment system (Myin 2016; 
Hutto & Myin 2013; Fuchs 2018). Myin and Zahnoun (2018) calls this “wide” 
identity, rather than the “narrow” identity of the sort that was characteristic of the 
Identity theory of mind (e.g. U.T. Place, and others). Going wide may come with its 
own issues, of course, but there is a clear proximity between such theories and 
sophisticated versions of behaviorism8.  
 
Still, it is appropriate to consider a more specific case study to test the general 
argument: the perception of other people (and their intentions). On what we might call 
the standard view of our access to other minds, which is indebted to Descartes but 
also has an ongoing life in cognitive science and philosophy (cf. Wheeler 2005), we 
                                                 
8 Two quotes from Shaun Gallagher’s recent book, Enactivist Interventions, are also suggestive of 
behaviorist commitments: 
mental skills such as reflection, problem solving, decision making, and so on, (are) enactive 
non-representational forms of embodied coping that are emergent from a pre-predicative 
perceptual ordering of differentiations and similarities (Gallagher 2017, 202). 
and 
with respect to PC models, enactivist views that emphasise a more holistic system of  brain-
body-environment would clearly favor a move away from internalist and intellectualist 
vocabularies (and conceptions of) ‘hypotheses’, ‘inference’ and ‘representation’ in favor of 
more embodied terms like ‘adjustment’, ‘attunement’ and ‘affordance’ (Gallagher 2017, 21).  
These terms are not only more embodied, but they also have a behaviorist dimension that is apparent 
even by attending to the words alone: the organism adjusts, attunes, and finds this or that affordance 
available. And the appeal to holism that characterizes Gallagher’s work is also part of a certain 
behaviorist tradition, rather than antithetical to it, as we have seen. 
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have direct and immediate knowledge of ourselves, at least in regard to some of our 
mental states. By contrast, we have only indirect or inferential knowledge of other 
people, because their mental states are hidden or imperceptible, and something more 
than perception is needed (theories, simulations, models, etc.). As is well-known, 
behaviorism of all types seeks to complicate, if not outright deny, this standard 
asymmetry thesis regarding knowledge of self and others. Proponents of embodied 
cognition and enactivism also challenge this picture, instead endorsing views in which 
we (sometimes) directly perceive other people’s intentions and emotional states, not 
just signs or expressions of them. This view, often called direct social perception 
(DSP), has come in for criticism for its apparent behaviorism (Jacob 2011), with 
critics essentially reprising the often told quip regarding two behaviorist zombies 
love-making and then one of them saying “I know it was good for you, but was it 
good for me?” (c.f. Ramanchandran and Hirstein 2000, 124)9. This old joke about 
behaviorism, intended as a reductio ad absurdum, has to be confronted, even if it 
depends on a certain conception of the physical and behavior that neither enactivism 
nor the proponents of behaviorism we have drawn on here endorse.  
 
To do so, we examine a paper by Gallagher and Varga, which argues for direct social 
perception (DSP) of emotions and some forms of intentional action. Their article also 
briefly replies to Jacob’s objections10. Jacob (2011) poses a dilemma to enactivist 
philosophers like Gallagher, Varga, and others, arguing that either their thesis of 
direct social perception of others (emotions, intentions, etc.) is committed to 
behaviorism (and thus is wrong, although no argument is really given for that), or 
their account of embodied and “smart” perception does not bring anything new to the 
table that might not be accommodated by other accounts of social cognition of a more 
inferential or theoretical focus, in which we “mind-read” rather than “body-read” (e.g. 
                                                 
9 There is something paradoxical about the idea of a behaviorist zombie, whatever bracketing of the 
mental, the intentional, etc., might be attempted by some versions of behaviorism. The very idea of 
zombies derives from functionalist criticisms of behaviorism (e.g. in Chalmers), rather than from 
behaviorism itself. They depend on the idea of “mere” or meaningless physical behavior, but neither 
behaviorism, nor phenomenology, nor enactivist biology, give these thought experiments and their 
insights into possibility much credence. 
10 We might also have chosen to look at the enactivist view of perception and cognition, which has 
been criticized by Block for its behaviorism (2005). Block criticizes Noë’s (2004) enactive account of 
action in perception, complaining that the view is behaviorist due to having no account of internal 
processes mediating between sensory inputs and outputs, but we agree with the enactivist-cum-
behaviorist insight that it is not clear that explanatory priority should be accorded to the internal 
processes. 
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Theory Theory, Simulation Theory, and hybrid views). In a subsequent paper, 
Gallagher and Varga respond, rhetorically ask of their own view:  
Is this a form of behaviorism? No. The idea of “thick” behavior involves 
rejecting the view that takes “behavior to be just bodily movement and so 
strips it of intentionality, relocating all that is alive and intelligent in the 
hidden mind” (Gallagher and Varga 2014, 190).  
This remark, however, is doubly ironic. It is Ryle who famously introduced the talk of 
“thick” behavior, and yet here Gallagher and Varga draw on this idea. In addition, 
they appear to associate behaviorism with theory of mind (via Leudar and Costall 
2004) in which the minds of others and particular mental states are treated as 
necessarily hidden and thus are ascribed through some complex process. This 
connection between behaviorism and theory of mind is also made in Gallagher’s 
recent book (2017, 71), but this involves a curious amalgam of anti-cognitivist 
behaviorism with the psychological cognitivism of Theory Theory (in philosophy) 
and Theory of Mind (in psychology). Behaviorism as we understand it is not attached 
to the “hidden minds” thesis at all, wherein other’s mental states are strictly 
imperceptible. Approaches that endorse such views (like Theory Theory or Theory of 
Mind) are actually associated with the cognitivist break with behaviorism in 
philosophy and psychology that we sketched earlier, wherein it was not intelligent 
performance in a situation that was the focus but the neural or psychological 
processes causing the relevant performance (with the holistic being-in-the-world 
connection broken). It appears to us that Gallagher and Varga have a reading of 
behaviorism that derives from Dennett’s work, but Dennett’s overall position is a 
hybrid view that incorporates functionalism (e.g. Dennett 1987). Indeed, Dennett’s 
view is at least partly based on his own critique of Skinner for “explaining away” 
intelligence rather than explaining it (Dennett 1978). His critique ignores that 
Skinner’s focus is on learnt behavior, not on the Sphex wasp’s instincts and reflexes. 
Dennett’s hybrid behaviorism, if it warrants the name, is quite different from that of 
his teacher, Ryle, as well as others in the behaviorist canon whom we have re-
introduced here (e.g. Mead, Tolman, Skinner, Baum, etc.).  
 
That said, Gallagher and Varga are right to point out that Jacob and others often 
invoke a reductive or “thin” understanding of behavior, involving mere movement, 
mere physicality. But they also go along with the terms of Jacob’s critique, which 
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disallows the behaviorist the chance to include the situation in which the action is 
performed, or any of the history of the agent, all elements which would grant a thicker 
behaviorist account, as we have seen in earlier sections. By neglecting this possibility, 
Jacob presents Gallagher and Varga with a dilemma, the first horn of which is that 
they really are committed to behaviorism:  
if the direct perception hypothesis argues that bodily expressions are 
constitutive of emotional or cognitive states, if they can be identified with 
patterns of observable behavior then direct perception advocates must embrace 
an unattractive behaviorist position. (Jacob 2011; Gallagher and Varga 2014, 
191)   
Such a behaviorist position, Jacob argues, precludes any interesting access to the first-
person perspective that is indeed part of enactivism, especially those versions of 
enactivism inspired by the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and others. We consider 
this point below, since there is something to this idea that the phenomenological 
inheritance complicates our comparison of enactivism and behaviorism, but for now it 
is important to see that Jacob’s “dilemma” trades on the idea that phenomenology is a 
kind of introspection, as well as the idea that behaviorism is an objectivism, neither of 
which stands up to scrutiny. 
 
Nonetheless, the other horn of Jacob’s dilemma is that if the behaviorist dimension of 
the DSP thesis is watered down, and it is held that bodily expressions do not 
constitute their emotional states, then “we do not directly perceive another’s mental 
states… we’ve made no advance beyond inferentialist approaches to other minds” 
(Krueger 2018, 309).  
 
Gallagher and Varga (and Joel Krueger in subsequent work) all respond by having a 
notion of constitution that is slightly weaker than that which Jacob ascribes to them. 
In Gallagher and Varga’s words: 
It is possible to maintain that some bodily actions are expressive of and partly 
constitute mental phenomena (in the sense that they actually make up their 
proper parts), without reducing psychological states to expressive behavior 
(Krueger and Overgaard 2012). The claim is simply that embodied mental 
states are only partly constituted by perceptible behaviors (italics added, 
Gallagher and Varga 2014, 191). 
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It is fair to say that a lot hangs on the “partly constituted” here, given objections 
concerning the so-called “causal-constitution fallacy” proffered by Aizawa (see 
below) and others against enactivism11, but Krueger also elaborates on the idea of 
constitution in useful ways, holding that: 
The relevant notion of “constitution” (i.e., in the claim that mental states are 
constituted by behavior) can be taken in a strong or weak sense. Taken in the 
strong sense, “constitutes” means “amounts to” or “equals”. If 
phenomenologists mean to say that mental states amount to or equal 
behavior—e.g., John’s anger simply is his frowning, fist-clenching, etc., and 
nothing more—this interpretation would commit them to a kind of crude 
behaviorism. But phenomenologists don’t endorse this strong sense of 
constitution. A second, weaker interpretation of “constitution” is available. On 
this interpretation, “constitutes” means “is a part of”— the way, for example, 
the tip of an iceberg constitutes a proper part of the iceberg (without, of 
course, constituting the entire iceberg). Tips are a constitutive part of icebergs, 
but icebergs are not wholly constituted by their tips. (Krueger 2018, 309) 
Krueger here connects both enactivist and phenomenological theses on direct social 
perception with a broader understanding of constitution. We think this is correct but 
maintain that this position is not significantly distinct from plausible rather than 
straw-man versions of behaviorism. The idea of perceiving another’s intentions in 
patterns of visible motor behavior does not refer to some mentality in the agent that is 
separate from (and causing) their action and behavior. It is thus not vulnerable to 
standard behaviorist concerns about imputing mental causation in lieu of an 
explanation. On this holistic story, the intentions are literally in rather than behind or 
causing the behaviour (see also Scharff 1999). 
 
If that is so, we need to think again about whether the unattractiveness of 
behaviorism, on which Jacob’s argument depends, is (mis)perceived or real. Perhaps 
what Gallagher and Varga actually present, contrary to their own self-understanding, 
is a holistic behaviorism that is not vulnerable to some of the reductios concerning 
mere behavior, zombies and the like, and which complicates the widespread 
                                                 
11 Kirchhoff (2015) shows that the objection depends on a particular metaphysical picture for its 
coherence (e.g. a picture of synchronic rather than diachronic emergence). 
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philosophical disjunctions between reasons and causes and directions of fit. In 
essence, then, we think they (incorrectly) accept the straw-man version of 
behaviorism, but protest (correctly) that the straw-man does not adequately capture 
their view, while also drawing on non-reductive behaviorism in their own work to 
prosecute many of their arguments12. By contrast, we want to endorse their 
arguments, but show they are compatible with the holistic behaviorist tradition we 
have outlined. 
 
Of course, there are various other objections that might be marshalled against 
Gallagher, Varga, Krueger, and other proponents of DSP (and notice that they are 
objections raised against behaviorism too). Aizawa (2017) and others contend that the 
rare but debilitating condition called “locked in” syndrome is an objection to any 
constitutive direct perception view of the relation between mind and behavior. We 
might also think about the skilled liar who is repeatedly able to deceive us. There are 
things to be said about both cases, notably that there is experimental evidence that 
“locked in” syndrome does directly transform the emotional lives of those suffering it 
(see Krueger 2018), and there is experimental evidence that we are often better at 
picking out the lie and duplicity than we think, even if we can rarely identify in any 
clear way why we may be suspicious and our post hoc rationalizations are often 
problematic (see Gallagher and Varga 2014)13. We agree with both of these 
responses, but they are broadly behaviorist in orientation. Emotions have facial 
manifestations, behavioral expressions, “action tendencies” or what the philosophical 
behaviorist will call dispositions. While there are questions to be explored concerning 
the idiosyncratic and singular nature of our emotional responses that appear to differ 
in the face of congruent stimuli (see Morag 2016), it remains the case that when one is 
in pain there are expressions of it, even if we might not all grimace, say “ouch”, and 
even if any given individual may not always express the pain in any one particular 
way. While there is likely no one-to-one relationship being the feeling and any 
particular form of pain behavior, no direct entailment between emotion and any one 
                                                 
12 Perhaps Varga effectively admits something like this in other work when he comes to embrace 
“embodied situationism” (see Varga 2017).  
13 A reviewer of this paper has noted that although it is often maintained that psychopaths are highly 
intelligent and expert manipulators, if we look at specific cases they are often quite crude in their 
machinations and may well betray themselves behaviorally, their colleagues and community often 
allow them to get away with it because they stick to certain conventions and norms. In other words, the 
deceived play as much of a role in the deception as the deceiver. 
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manifestation, there are more or less tight connections (probabilistic, as Rowlands 
1991 contends) in each case. Furthermore, what seems clear to us is that such 
connections have a solid base to be studied behavioristically in terms of physiological 
and environmental factors in a non-reductive way, even if it remains an open question 
what else is needed here (e.g. phenomenological treatments of experience, Gibsonian 
affordances, etc.). 
 
4. Behaviorism in phenomenology?  
 
It might be protested that enactivist behaviorism is an implausible conjunction, not 
least because of the enactivist indebtedness to phenomenology, the latter of which 
involves some differing methodological commitments. Phenomenology also explicitly 
opposed some forms of behaviorism, notably the work of Watson (but this is not the 
radical, molar, or logical behaviorism outlined in this paper). And we cannot deny 
that contemporary enactivism is significantly indebted to phenomenology, with 
philosophers like Dan Hutto and Erik Myin 2013 being an exception to the rule. To 
deal with this potential objection, then, one move available to us is to reassert that our 
focus is on Rylean holistic behaviorism, which itself drew heavily on Heidegger and 
Husserl. Another is to say that enactivism, having an engagement with science and a 
default naturalism of at least a weak, “liberal”, or “relaxed” sort, must engage 
questions that classical transcendental phenomenology does not. In the process, it also 
transforms that tradition in ways that are significant enough to make our juxtaposition 
convincing. Indeed, none of the theories we are grappling with here – behaviorism, 
phenomenology and enactivism – are committed to strong or scientific naturalism, nor 
positivism. And while behaviorism is much more pro-scientific than the classical 
phenomenological tradition, of course, it is more pragmatist than positivist in its 
approach (see Baum 2005). 
 
That said, it is also worth tackling the objection more directly, by tracing some 
behaviorist aspects present in classical phenomenology, as surprising as this might 
seem, given that phenomenologically-inspired philosophers like Gallagher and 
Thompson (and others) rarely draw on behaviorist thinkers and often disavow any 
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link14. We have seen, already, that phenomenology and behaviorism both turn to 
skillful behavior as an antidote to our inheritance of Cartesianism and materialism 
respectively. They often endorse something like the direct social perception view of 
the intentions and emotions of others. There is also a priority or “primacy of 
perception” view in common, in which so-called higher forms of cognition are 
situated in that context, and such approaches fit better with bottom-up rather than top-
down approaches, regarding say the priority of online cognition over the offline, 
wherein one is not directly engaging with or manipulating the environment (Wheeler 
2005). Finally, habit and knowing-how are key to both traditions, rather than 
knowledge of a propositional sort, which might be given a cognitivist rendering. So 
while they are not giving a behaviorist ontology of consciousness and cognition, and 
certainly not a reductive or thin one, there are a variety of overlapping views that are 
congenial to the kind of behaviorism we have outlined, elaborating views of human 
motivation and behavior that avoid the dualism between reasons and causes on which 
contemporary philosophy has bifurcated. 
 
But we promised an engagement with a classical phenomenologist, and it is 
appropriate to consider Merleau-Ponty. Are mental and intentional states best 
explained through behavior, for phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty? Establishing 
that would require detailed discussions of sexual intentionality, for example, which is 
addressed at some length in his Phenomenology of Perception, which we cannot 
undertake here. Nonetheless, there are some important concepts in Merleau-Ponty’s 
work, emphasized and developed to good effect by Hubert Dreyfus, which are worth 
reflecting on in this context. 
 
Famously, of course, Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the importance of embodied 
intentionality, including the manner in which our body develops skills and capacities 
that enable us to engage with the world, a practical know-how rather than knowledge-
that (Merleau-Ponty 2008). This “motor-intentionality” is often not something that we 
                                                 
14 Indeed, while many contemporary phenomenologists (or enactivists drawing on phenomenology) 
have insisted that they are not advocating behaviorism (e.g. Romano 2016, 340; Gallagher 2017, 69-70; 
Morris 2010; Thompson 2007, 50; Noë 2004, 32-33), they clearly perceive sufficient proximity to 
behaviorism such that they are motivated to (attempt to) establish the distance. In addition, we think the 
contrast they draw with behaviorism often depends on a straw-man version of the view. The precise 
behaviorist target is often difficult to identify, and it rarely countenances the sort of holistic position we 
have traced from Ryle, and both radical and molar behaviorism. 
 23
are directly aware of but involves a pre-reflective bodily orientation or comportment 
towards the world that enables us to attend particular objects, say, in our visual field. 
These bodily habits are not random, and nor do they appear to be mere mechanism, or 
mere reaction. They are drawn from our past and from our culture, comprehensible in 
terms of this or that intentional project, even if not conceptualized as such by the 
agent. Moreover, as we develop particular habits we also acquire skills wherein the 
cultural and normative dimension is more apparent (cf. Sachs 2014). On this model, 
there is certainly a holism, and perhaps even something akin to a “belief-desire-
perception circle”. The latter has been identified as a problem with behaviorism since 
Putnam (see Rowlands 1991). In short, the idea is that this “circle” in human behavior 
is sufficiently dynamic and complex that we cannot identify any nomological 
relationship between a particular mental state (pain) and behavior, since behavior 
depends not just on the feeling of pain but also an array of beliefs about how pain 
should or should not be expressed, implicit norms of this or that society (which are 
instantiated in the world in practices), and a given individual’s history. We agree that 
this cannot be escaped but, again, the lesson is that reductive behaviorism is wrong 
(reduction to discrete mental states, for example), not behaviorism tout court, as we 
argued in our above discussion of the super-Spartans.  
 
And philosophers like Merleau-Ponty can help us to re-think this “belief-desire-
perception” circle, including by drawing on and expanding some behaviorist ideas. 
For example, on his embodied account of perception objects are never given to us as 
neutral, but always informed by our context: in perceiving objects (say the rocky 
crag) we are given at a pre-reflective level a solicitation in terms of our own possible 
behaviors, which reflects our projects in the world over a period of time (rather than 
in an instant), and our physical capacities qua trained and fit (or not). Perception is 
tightly connected to motility and action in a manner that Alva Noë’s Action and 
Perception also emphasizes (2004), and with training and skills also has a normative 
and cultural aspect. We are presented with what Claude Romano calls “a manifold of 
possible behaviors that instill within things ends, practical vectors, attractions, 
repulsions, lines of force, dumb or tacit meanings obscurely deciphered by our 
bodies” (Romano 2016, 339).  
 
 24
To understand this view, and how it relates to the sort of holistic behaviorism outlined 
above, we also need to consider what Merleau-Ponty calls an “intentional arc”. For 
Merleau-Ponty, this arc is meant to be more than mere behavior because it is tied to: 
“our past, our future, our human milieu, our physical situation, our ideological 
situation, and our moral situation” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 137). However, how this 
intentional arc gets built up can be explicated in holistic behaviorist terms. Indeed, 
this is essentially what Hubert Dreyfus does in his influential account of coping and 
skill-acquisition. Behind Dreyfus’ use of Merleau-Ponty’s idea of an intentional arc 
(Dreyfus 2002a, 2007) is a simple idea that intelligence emerges through “finer and 
finer discriminations of situations paired with the appropriate response to each” 
(Dreyfus 2002b, 367). Such fine-grained distinctions are working towards an “optimal 
gestalt”, or a “maximum grip”, which both guide behavior and make it meaningful. 
While Merleau-Ponty got the idea of the intentional arc from the German 
psychopathologist Franz Fischer, the overall picture of intelligence has resonances 
with behaviorism that are emphasised in Dreyfus’ interpretation.  
 
It is useful to recall that it is the structure/form/Gestalt of behavior, for both animals 
and humans, that is the focus of Merleau-Ponty’s first book, The Structure of 
Behavior. While Merleau-Ponty criticizes Watson’s (1913) behaviorism for its 
atomistic account of reflexes that gives up any sort of holistic understanding of the 
organism and its milieu, behavior is nonetheless identified as a pivotal concept, being 
neither mental nor physical or, alternatively, both mental and physical15. Likewise, 
Ryle’s various analyses in The Concept of Mind or Dilemmas, for example, are 
typically not reducible to mental or physical facts. Does the intentionality of 
consciousness and lived-experience (mental states or not) cause behavior, or might 
the former be reduced without remainder to behavior? Merleau-Ponty and Ryle both 
challenge this dilemma. For Merleau-Ponty, there is reciprocal causation here, 
between these levels, much as Gibson’s notions of solicitations and affordances also 
trouble this dilemma and opposition. As such, non-reductive behaviorism and non-
Cartesian phenomenology both explore a view that does not neatly fit the standard 
                                                 
15 Others have recognized that the work of Mead (Rosenthal and Bougeois 1991) and Ryle (Jackson 
2011; Evans 1983) is aligned with Merleau-Ponty. They have done so by downplaying Mead and 
Ryle’s respective commitments to behaviorism. We agree with the connections they have forged, but 
think that they should embrace non-reductive behaviorism. Edward Tolman’s work is also important 
here, as Merleau-Ponty himself recognizes. 
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dichotomy between reasons and causes, or between so-called “directions of fit”, 
conceived of as either mind-to-world or world-to-mind. In later work, like Child 
Psychology and Pedagogy: The Sorbonne Lectures 1949-52, Merleau-Ponty 
continues to have positive things to say about behaviorism, particularly Tolman’s 
“molar” version of it, which Merleau-Ponty contends grasps behavior in its totality, 
including economic and historical environment, and provides the resources to “fulfill 
the initial project proposed by Watsonian behaviorism” (Merleau-Ponty 2010, 343). 
 
Although we cannot focus on Heidegger’s philosophy in any detail here, it is worth 
noting that Dreyfus’s influential reading of Heidegger also emphasizes skills and 
absorbed coping in a non-representational manner. On his view, skills and absorbed 
coping are a “disposition to respond to situations in appropriate ways” (Dreyfus 1990, 
117). It is important to recognize that Dreyfus’ material on “equipmentality”, which 
we can gloss as the ready-to-hand use of tools (i.e. a hammer) in a social context, is 
thoroughly holistic. We cannot explain a tool in non-intentional and non-normative 
ways, as reductive behaviorism might seek. As such, it is not narrow behaviorism at 
stake, but Dreyfus still explicitly reads Heidegger as advocating “a sort of 
behaviorism” (Dreyfus 1990, 147), and draws on dispositions to respond in doing so. 
Whether this is a satisfactory reading of Heidegger tout court might be questioned, 
but it characterizes an important part of Being and Time16.  
 
Evan Thompson’s autopoetic version of enactivism draws on Merleau-Ponty’s work 
in quite different ways from Dreyfus, but Thompson still holds that skillful activity is 
not the cause of experience but “is the experience” (Thompson 2007, 256). In such 
formulations we are returned to the idea of enactivism endorsing a “mind-behavior 
identity theory”, which has clear links to forms of behaviorism that adhere to the 
Rylean dictum that overt intelligent performances are not clues to the working of 
minds, that rather they are those workings. Like Gallagher and others, however, 
Thompson denies the link. He says that contrary to behaviorism, perceptual 
experience is mediated by skillful mastery, which is between sensory stimulus and 
                                                 
16 Ryle sometimes himself recognized this, both early in his career when he drew on Heidegger’s 
treatment of the ready-to-hand/present-at-hand distinction in his own accounts of know-how and 
knowledge-that, and later in his career when two pages of his 15 page autobiographical essay are 
devoted to phenomenology (cf. Thomasson 2002, Chase and Reynolds 2017). 
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motor response (2007, 256). Of course, Ryle made the same point, but took this 
recognition to be congenial to behaviorism rather than opposed to it. Indeed, that 
perception is influenced by one’s relationship to one’s environment would appear to 
be grist for the behaviorist mill. While skills might be thought to be developments of 
brute dispositions or habits, this is a difference in degree rather than kind.  
 
For us, this view renews the prospect of an expanded behaviorism. Cognitivist 
approaches contest reductive (or molecular) behaviorism, often by pointing to the 
poverty of the stimulus, which seems insufficient to explain the complexity of the 
behavior. On the cognitivist view, the stimulus (i.e. perceptual and/or environment 
information) is poor and so something more – language, representations, simulations, 
imaginations, implicit or explicit inferences, and reflective problem-solving – are 
required to explain intelligence. But, what we see in both contemporary enactivism 
and the behaviorist traditions we have drawn on here (logical, molar, and radical) is 
that the stimulus is not “poor”; rather, through streams of interactions, the data is rich 
and complex. In addition, the response or action needs to be comprehended as a 
response from an organism in a situated context, involving the history of the 
organism, ontogenetically and phylogenetically, and a complex relationship between 
the distal and proximal causes that includes the socio-cultural. While this general 
position obviously stands in need of further behavioral analyses, and the sorts of 
scientific experiments conducted in the name of embodied cognition and enactivism, 




Many of the critiques of behaviorism aim at a crude version that few actually 
defended, both when it was initially displaced by cognitivism and also today as a 
caricatured version of the theory is disparaged, even by those who might be at least 
friends of behaviorism. But enactivists and theorists of embodied cognition should not 
concede this, which is to buy into the world view of their cognitivist opponents. If our 
argument is a good one, both in descriptively characterizing an holistic account of 
behaviorism and in beginning to defend some aspects of them, then perhaps the 
renaissance in behaviorism might be explicitly proclaimed and recognized as such. Is 
enactivism and embodied cognition a version of behaviorism? We are not claiming 
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anything quite so strong here, but if the alleged “difference maker” between 
contemporary enactivism and philosophical behaviorism is just to draw on social and 
historical factors and the “body in situation” to explain intentional action, then there is 
clearly an important overlap. In addition, both classical and contemporary more 
empirically oriented versions of phenomenology put forward views that look like 
behaviorism and which can be enhanced by behavioristic analyses. Contrary to 
common acceptation, they are strange but complementary bedfellows. In addition, we 
have shown that many contemporary positions appear to draw on sophisticated 
versions of behaviorism, contrary to their own protestations, and that any 
development in these fields also contributes to what we have labeled holistic 
behaviorism and vice versa. We say this not as an intended reductio of the position, 
but to show how it might not be vulnerable to some of the major critiques (which 
trade on the behaviorist bogeyman) as well as to indicate where work might be done 
to strengthen the position. Furthermore, this approach would be mutually beneficial in 
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